belief and of other intentional states, her account appears to be sensitive to scientific refinement and revisions of these concepts coming from different branches of cognitive science. Thus, although she does not provide an explicit account of the ontological underpinning of her interpretationism, her account of beliefs and delusions might be better suited than traditional versions of interpretationism to answer to the needs of psychiatric theory and treatment.

In conclusion, this book offers a significant and successful example of the emerging 'new' analytic philosophy of psychiatry. Methodologically, it exemplifies a fruitful two-way interaction between philosophy and empirical investigation. Empirical results from cognitive sciences and clinical research are used to constrain philosophical assumptions about beliefs and delusions. Rigorous philosophical argumentation is employed to clarify and adjudicate theoretical interpretations of empirical data concerning delusions. This work is surely an obligatory reading for those seriously interested in delusions, beliefs and, more in general, the application of an empirically informed philosophy of mind to psychiatry.

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Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen
Kwame Anthony Appiah
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xix + 264 pp., £19.99 (Hb)

It is easy to see why moral philosophers might overlook the concept of honor, if not regard its continued influence in modern life as retrograde. Honor is a notion that can seem to be inextricably tied to ‘shame cultures’ and to the morally dubious tenet that receiving the praise of others is of paramount importance to living a good life. For those of us interested in autonomous moral motivation and not in the ethos of keeping up appearances, the ethics of honor might seem atavistic or childish — ersatz morality.

Kwame Anthony Appiah’s latest short book argues that this view of honor is mistaken, and dangerously so. The book is intended for the general public, and is equal parts historical investigation of social change and philosophical account of honor. In each of the book’s first four chapters, Appiah provides a different case study of what he terms moral revolutions — the end of dueling in Britain, the end of slavery in Britain, the end of female footbinding in China, and the contemporary push to end the honor killing of (mostly) women in Pakistan — and shows how the concern for honor, and not the purported discovery of moral truths or of any compelling arguments for those purported truths, ‘galvanizes’ (p. 110) the social movements responsible for those revolutions. The fifth, and final, chapter sketches a ‘basic theory’ (p. 175) of honor that draws together the many insightful remarks from earlier in the book and considers several objections to that account. Appiah argues throughout that misunderstanding the workings of honor risks misunderstanding both the history of moral progress (though, perhaps notably, Appiah

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rarely uses the word ‘progress’) as well as our own moral situation. Indeed, in one of his many pretty turns of phrase, Appiah notes that ‘We live not after honor but with new forms of honor’ (p. 193).

Among his many aims in writing this book, Appiah hopes to convince philosophers that honor constitutes a fruitful and much understudied topic in the fields of moral psychology and social philosophy. Appiah convincingly shows that honor is importantly tied to the moral emotions (especially to pride, shame, and contempt), to one’s social identity, to the value of patriotism and group solidarity, and to moral motivation in general. I will briefly pursue some of these ties along with a summary of Appiah’s basic theory, before offering some reservations.

Appiah engages with honor in terms of the concept of respect and argues that there are two forms of honor corresponding to two forms of respect. A person is worthy of competitive honor when he or she merits respect for excelling relative to some honor code. A person is worthy of peer honor when he or she merits respect, not on the basis of meeting certain standards, but rather on the basis of a recognition of a shared status. Achilles is concerned with competitive honor when he strives to excel in his military prowess, whereas an aristocratic gentleman is concerned with peer honor when he believes that a fellow gentleman has treated him as an inferior. The status relevant to peer honor is a function of one’s membership in an ‘honor world’ and of one’s social identity within that world. An honor world consists of people who understand and acknowledge the same code of honor, and one’s social identity determines what practices a code of honor demands of one. For example, 19th century British citizens shared an honor world that corresponded to an honor code that made different demands on aristocratic gentlemen, aristocratic ladies, and peasants. Appiah notes that this honor code called upon and permitted to duel only those with the social identity of gentlemen.

Although, unlike competitive honor, peer honor need not be earned to be deserved it can nonetheless (Appiah argues) cease to be deserved if one fails to live up to certain standards. An aristocrat deserves his fellow aristocrat’s peer honor by the mere fact of his birth (say), but if he behaves unlike a gentleman he can cease to deserve his fellow’s peer honor. Appiah takes the fact that deserved peer honor is conditioned upon meeting certain standards to show that peer honor requires a positive regard for the object of honor. This interpretation threatens the fundamental distinction between the two types of honor, since it implies that peer honor shares in a defining feature of competitive honor, namely, the ‘positive regard for the person in virtue of the fact that it recognizes’ (p. 14). Appiah notes this overlap, but insists that the two types of honor are worth distinguishing both because they have different bases for their regard (success and group membership, respectively) and because competitive honor is scalar while peer honor is an all-or-nothing affair.

However I remain unconvinced that this conceptual framework makes the most sense of Appiah’s own rich examples. For example, Appiah notes that 19th century British gentlemen demanded deferential recognition, but not positive appraisal, from peasants. This fact points to two shortcomings of Appiah’s account. First, there is the nominal point that ‘peer honor’ evidently involves more than just honor from one’s peers. The peasant example shows that that form of honor is better thought of more generically as recognition honor, which can (and must) be offered even by non-peer members of one’s honor world. Second, the example confirms that there is a form of honor unrelated to positive regard. Indeed, as readers of Jane Austen know, aristocrats demand of each other not positive regard but rather the appearance of positive regard. Appiah’s first extended
case study recounts that the Duke of Wellington challenged the Earl of Winchilsea to a duel not because the latter had a negative appraisal of the Duke (though he did have such an appraisal of him) but rather because the latter failed to behave towards the Duke as befitting a fellow gentleman. There seems to be no reason (in this central case study at least) to include positive regard as a necessary condition of recognition honor.

The inclusion of positive regard also leads Appiah to the radical claim that respect for a person’s human dignity is contingent upon his or her decency. In other words the peer honor we grant to others in virtue of their status as human beings, like all such honor, depends upon their meeting certain basic standards. He writes, ‘if you fail to live up to your humanity, you can lose it’ (p. 131). Strangely, there is no mention in the text that this offhand remark appears to conflict with the recognition of inviolable human rights — an apparent problem for Appiah’s account so long as even contemptible human beings deserve some level of peer honor. Appiah is driven to this striking claim not by any argument, but rather by the conflation of peer honor with competitive honor. None of Appiah’s stated reasons for including positive appraisal as a necessary condition of peer honor is strong enough to support this entailment of the inclusion.

Appiah may simply be getting at the fact that being an \( L \), where \( L \) is some (though perhaps not just any) identity, requires living in minimal accordance with some norm. Being a gentleman requires acting to at least some extent like a gentleman. But even if this were so, it would not entail that recognition honor includes an appraisal of the person as living in accordance with those norms, for recognition honor needn’t involve any appraisal whatsoever. It might require only certain behavioral dispositions, as the case of the Duke of Wellington shows. Appiah’s examples motivate an account of honor that cleanly separates competitive (or appraisal-based) honor from recognition honor, which consists only of a disposition to recognize a person’s identity and to treat him or her as the shared honor code dictates.

With a basic theory of honor in hand, we are better prepared to answer important questions about the exact relation between honor and morality. Appiah holds that honor is completely neutral from a moral point of view and gives the impression that it is a happy historical accident that honor is sometimes ‘moralized’ in such a way as to be linked with moral revolutions. At several points Appiah notes, rightly, that an honor code might demand the performance of a wrong action; elsewhere he concludes that ‘The wrongness of [honor] killings is essential to the explanation of why they are shameful; as were the wrongness of footbinding and slavery to the arguments that they were sources of Chinese and British shame’ (p. 172). But if ‘honor and morality are separate systems’ (p. 108) then it is puzzling how the wrongness of an act could be essential to its being shameful. There might have been non-moral sources of the shamefulness of these activities, as there was when dueling came to be seen by the aristocracy as shamelessly lower-class.

If the topic of Appiah’s book is the connection between honor and morality then the sparse attention that he gives to the theoretical connection may disappoint philosophers. He notes repeatedly that codes of honor are sometimes aligned with moral norms, and that when they are so aligned honor often galvanizes social movements for moral progress; but in only four pages (pp. 179–183) does Appiah scrutinize the topic in any more fundamental theoretical way. There he argues that when codes of honor are moralized the pursuit of honor can be morally praiseworthy. But there is reason to think that honor and morality are more deeply linked, at least from the first-personal point of view. For there seems to be a tension of some sort in believing of an act both that it is
wrong and that it is honorable, and it is difficult to imagine a person having these beliefs (if at all) without experiencing some dilemma. Honor among thieves will not likely seem morally wrong to the thieves themselves, even if thievery does. For better or for worse, a person’s honor code guides his or her sense of what is morally good, and vice versa — which explains why the perceived wrongness of an act will often be central to its being shameful. For the agent herself, even if not for the spectator, moral constraints seem to be sewn into the fabric of honor.

It may be that such theoretical questions are beyond the scope of this primarily historical study (indeed, the book’s copyright page lists ‘Social change — History’ prior to the topic, ‘Social change — Moral and ethical aspects’). Appiah does neglect, however, to address one of his self-assigned historical subjects, namely, the influence of ‘a tradition of moral hostility to pride’ (p. 17). In the book’s first chapter, Appiah promises to discuss Christian and Stoic antagonism in the following chapter. So the reader is disappointed at missing the chance to know Appiah’s thoughts on the matter when he fails to broach the topic in that chapter, as well as in the rest of the book.

In any case, Appiah’s new book raises these and many other important and neglected philosophical questions, which merit careful investigation. That Appiah was able to accomplish this in a popular book, while simultaneously offering a history of social change, is remarkable and sets a new bar for philosophical works in that genre.

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The Presence of Nature: A Study in Phenomenology and Environmental Philosophy
S. P. JAMES
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viii + 167 pp., (hb) £50.00

James’ overall aim is ‘to demonstrate the merits of a phenomenological approach [his own] to environmental philosophy’ (p. 153). The result will therefore be of particular interest to those working in either of these philosophical traditions. Those already steeped in the phenomenological literature may well object to the ‘shameless . . . plunder[ing]’ (p. 9) of major works James carries out in order to create his own phenomenological approach, but others better equipped than I will have to judge for themselves the quality of his engagement with phenomenological tradition. His demonstration of the merits of the resultant phenomenological approach for environmental philosophy, however, is convincingly executed, and it is all the more impressive for the elegance, clarity and occasional humour of his writing. Readers with little background in phenomenology will appreciate not only the care James has taken in order to introduce phenomenological concepts with a minimum of linguistic complexity, but also his wry asides regarding traditional phenomenological terminology. Those seeking an engaging