Self-Assessment and Social Practices

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It appears that the emotions of pride and shame are about living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. One might take pride in being a friendly neighbor, a fierce athlete, or a considerate friend; or in having a sharp memory, a politically distinguished lineage, or a stylish haircut. Likewise, one might be ashamed of being a stingy friend or a cowardly politician, or in having slave-holding ancestors or a bad reputation. Each instance of pride or shame seems to correspond to at least one personal ideal that one regards as worthy and as binding on oneself.

However, pride and shame are not merely self-regarding affairs. Pride is a social phenomenon, and this sociality is a significant draw of the attention that moralists and other social thinkers, from Augustine to Rousseau to Malcolm X, have given to it. Precisely because it helps us to understand a person’s relations to others, pride is also an important theme in many literary works, from Homer’s Iliad and Milton’s Paradise Lost to Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, and Wharton’s Ethan Frome. In particular, and notoriously, the emotion of pride is related somehow to a concern for both elevated social status and camaraderie with others.

These facts raise two puzzles. First, we must explain how these emotions can be fundamentally self-regarding as well as profoundly social. On the one hand, they are implicated in one’s conception of who one should be and, so, might not seem to concern one’s relations to others (as gratitude and guilt more obviously do). On the other hand, in addition to the religious, political, and literary expressions of the social dimensions of pride alluded to above, the phenomenology of pride and shame seem to involve the image of an observer of oneself. But it is puzzling how an appraisal of the self could take the form of a representation of another person. Call this the sociality puzzle: how pride and shame can be both self-regarding and social phenomena.

Indeed, the social dimensions of pride and shame are so pervasive that one might argue that, contrary to appearances, these emotions have little to do with self-assessment. According to this sociality objection, the so-called sociality puzzle arises only for individualistic accounts of pride and shame, such as the personal ideals account mentioned above. Several philosophers have developed this objection to individualistic accounts of shame, such as the account proposed by John Rawls, that construe shame as the experience of a loss of self-esteem or self-worth. John Deigh objects to Rawls’s account by arguing that “we should
conceive shame, not as a reaction to a loss [of self-esteem], but as a reaction to a threat, specifically, the threat of demeaning treatment one would invite in giving the appearance of someone of lesser worth. Its analogues then are, not grief and sorrow, but fear and shyness."  

Deigh, therefore, understands shame as an assessment that one’s relations to others are threatened rather than as a judgment that one is failing to live in accordance with one’s personal ideals or life plans. Likewise, J. David Velleman argues that “anxiety about social disqualification constitutes the emotion of shame.”  

Finally, Cheshire Calhoun argues that “shaming criticisms work by impressing on the person that she has disappointed not just one individual’s expectations but what some ‘we’ expected of her. In effect they say, ‘You claim to be one of us, but just look how you’re behaving!’”

This social conception of shame suggests that, by analogy, the emotion of pride is best understood as something like contentment or confidence about the strength of one’s relations to others, regardless of one’s judgments of self-worth. This understanding is prevalent in the social sciences, where sociologists and social psychologists have long argued that pride is in the first place a sense of camaraderie with others, and not a type of self-assessment. Thomas Scheff defends the view that “pride and shame serve as instinctive signals, both to the self and other,” that inform oneself and others of the state of one’s social bonds. Scheff summarizes his view as follows:

I follow the lead of [Charles] Cooley and [Erving] Goffman, whose work implies that pride and shame are the primary social emotions. These two emotions have a signal function with respect to the social bond. In this framework, pride and shame serve as intense and automatic bodily signs of the state of a system that would be otherwise difficult to observe, the state of one’s bonds to others. Pride is the sign of an intact bond; shame, a severed or threatened bond.

Scheff, and in his view Cooley and Goffman, hold that the emotion of pride is primarily an indicator of “intact” social bonds. How could this be so if, as I suggested above, pride is about living in accordance with one’s personal ideals?

In this article, I argue that the sociality objection to personal ideal accounts of pride and shame misfires because it presupposes an overly individualistic account of personal ideals and the self-assessments that they ground. To establish this conclusion, I sketch an alternative social practice theory of personal ideals. This alternative theory of personal ideals undermines the sharp dichotomy between evaluative self-assessment and assessment of one’s social standing that underlies the sociality objection. On this view, self-assessment is both conceptually and psychologically related to judgments about one’s standing in particular social practices. Although I offer here no independent argument in support of the personal ideals account of pride and shame, the arguments of this article, if sound, redeem the account by showing that it is compatible with the
sociological insights that motivate its critics to develop competing social accounts of pride and shame.\textsuperscript{8}

This social practice theory of personal ideals also helps to solve a second puzzle, one that concerns pride’s social dimensions alone and that poses a problem for social accounts of pride like Scheff’s. It is puzzling that pride should be connected both to a conception of oneself as enjoying intact social bonds as well as to a notoriously divisive concern for social status—that is, for what sets oneself apart from other members of one’s social group.\textsuperscript{9} Feeling pride is linked psychologically, if not conceptually, with thinking that the object of one’s pride is unique.\textsuperscript{10} Although unique excellence can provide the basis for social bonding, several kinds of vicious pride, such as haughty, arrogant, and conceited pride, are socially pernicious. Call this the \textit{superiority paradigm} of pride, to contrast it with the \textit{camaraderie paradigm} that Scheff and others describe. This latter paradigm of pride, unlike the former, makes no reference whatsoever to interpersonal hierarchy. So, the second puzzle is that pride seems to be important related to both divisive hierarchy and unstratified social relations. Call this the \textit{hierarchy puzzle}.

In what follows, I explore these two puzzles and their relation to each other. I argue that we can solve them both by developing an account of personal ideals that makes manifest the social form and social content of these ideals. In Section 1, I examine in greater detail Deigh’s formulation of the sociality objection. In Section 2, I develop the social practice theory of personal ideals, which makes explicit the social nature of at least some personal ideals. In Section 3, I apply this account of personal ideals to the two puzzles. As I noted above, with respect to the first puzzle, the social practice theory of personal ideals undermines an unsupported premise of the sociality objection: that judgments about living in accordance with our personal ideals are conceptually independent of considerations about the status of our relationships to those with whom we share a moral practice. In other words, I agree with Calhoun, Deigh, and Velleman that shame (and pride) involves judgments about one’s relations to others, but insist that one’s representations of these relations depend on one’s representations of how one is faring with respect to one’s personal ideals. Indeed, without reference to our personal ideals we could not in the first place pick out which of our relationships are relevant to shame (and pride).\textsuperscript{11}

With respect to the second puzzle, I argue that a commitment to living in accordance with one’s ideals involves a commitment to a social practice and to living in accordance with norms that guide representative members of that practice. I also argue that the judgment involved in the emotion of pride, that one is living in accordance with one’s personal ideals, entails a judgment that one warrants respect from fellow members of the practice. This judgment grounds the camaraderie that, as Scheff notes, pride often reflects. Conversely, I conclude that the sense of interpersonal superiority that sometimes accompanies pride is typically founded in a failure to cognitively and conatively appreciate the social basis of one’s personal ideals.
1. The Sociality Objection

According to personal ideals accounts of pride and shame, these emotions are constitutively linked to one’s assessments about the extent to which one is living in accordance with one’s personal ideals, which are norms about what sort of person one should be. In an influential article, John Deigh offers several kinds of apparent counter-examples against one version of the personal ideals account, which he associates with John Rawls, according to which one feels shame on losing self-esteem. On this Rawlsian account, “one has self-esteem if, first, one regards one’s aims and ideals as worthy and, second, one believes that one is well suited to pursue them.” So, for instance, shame in being a stingy friend might involve either recognition of the stinginess of one’s aims and ideals or, perhaps, an assessment that one is not able to pursue one’s ideals of caring and friendship. Deigh suggests that the failure of the Rawlsian account spells doom for all self-directed accounts of shame.

Deigh argues that the Rawlsian account is vulnerable to counter-examples in which one experiences shame because of shaming criticism or ridicule that one rejects, such as the shame that Crito fears he will be exposed to when fellow Athenians unjustly criticize him for failing to facilitate his friend Socrates’s escape from prison. Deigh concludes that “[e]xamples like this one demonstrate that shame is often more, when it is not exclusively, a response to the evident deprecatory opinion others have of one than an emotion aroused upon judgment that one’s aims are shoddy or that one is deficient in talent or ability necessary to achieve them.” According to Deigh, then, shame is not necessarily—or even typically—linked to one’s assessment that one is failing in some way to live in accordance with one’s personal ideals.

Deigh also presents as counter-examples cases of shame that appear to have more to do with a betrayal of one’s social identity than with failing to live up to one’s personal ideals. An aristocrat might be ashamed to behave as a common person, Deigh claims, even if he does not by such behavior violate any of his life plans or personal ideals. The same point, according to Deigh, holds true of a Mashpee Indian who does not particularly care about his “Indian background” but who is nonetheless ashamed at being unable to join an Iroquois and a Chippewa in an “Indian dance.” It seems that such cases of shame need not involve any assessment that one is failing to live up to one’s standards of personal excellence. Such shame concerns who one is, and one’s identity is not fully captured by one’s ideals or how one conducts one’s life in pursuit of those ideals.

Deigh draws two general lessons from these and other apparent counter-examples to the Rawlsian account. First, “a satisfactory characterization [of shame] must include in a central role one’s concern for the opinions of others.” The shame that Crito anticipates is best understood as centrally involving his concern for the opinion of his fellow citizens, where this concern is distinct from a concern for living in accordance with worthy personal ideals. Second, a satisfactory account of shame must “recognize aspects of our identity...
that contribute to our sense of worth independently of the aims and ideals around which we organize our lives.” In particular, it must not presuppose that our sense of worth is limited to what we derive as authors of our lives. Contributions related to one’s social status or essential nature must be considered.

In order for Deigh’s critique of the Rawlsian personal ideals account of shame to succeed, such an account must be incapable of learning these two lessons. In particular, our best understanding of personal ideals must give no central role to concerns for the opinions of others. One’s commitment to living in accordance with these ideals must be insensitive to the judgments of others—or, at least, sensitive to these concerns only insofar as they impact one’s ability to achieve one’s aims. Second, the standards provided by personal ideals must be restricted to our activity as authors of our lives, and these standards must treat one’s social status as at least somewhat independent of this self-assessment. This would be so if our best understanding of personal ideals construed them as norms that are insensitive to the opinions of others, and the content of which is restricted to our activity as authors of our lives. As Deigh puts it, according to this theory of personal ideals, “what a person does with his life, how well he directs it, determines his worth.” Following Deigh, let us call any account of personal ideals that is committed to such assumptions an auteur theory of personal ideals.

Deigh convincingly argues that pride and shame often reflect concerns about the opinions of others and one’s social status. However, he takes this conclusion to show that pride and shame typically do not directly or primarily concern one’s real worth. Instead, these emotions reflect concerns about the relation between the appearance (to others) and the reality of one’s worth; or, as he puts it, “a sense of worth that comes from knowing one’s status or essential nature reflects concern with the congruency between one’s conduct or appearance and one’s real worth.” On this view, shame is occasioned by what makes one appear to have less worth than one really has.

In what follows, I argue that there is a third way. We can agree that pride and shame typically reflect social concerns without having to deny that these emotions are directly about one’s real worth. But to do so we need a properly social theory of personal ideals. So, in the next section I sketch a social practice theory of personal ideals. By rejecting the auteur theory in favor of this social practice theory, the personal ideals account of pride and shame can be defended.

2. Personal Ideals

The following sketch of a theory of personal ideals is divided into three sub-sections. Section 2.1 presents an account of how ideals are individuated by reference to social practices; Section 2.2 presents an account of how social practices contour reasoning about the content of ideals; and Section 2.3 connects the foregoing to certain aspects of our emotional experiences.
2.1 A Social Topography of Personal Ideals

Personal ideals are conceptions of what sort of person one should be, including what sorts of character, attitudes, projects, relationships, and social roles one should have. In this subsection, I argue that personal ideals are individuated with respect to the social practices to which they apply (their generality) and to the ordering of the particular values and aims that constitute them (their complexity).20

As P. F. Strawson noted, the dependence of ideals on social practices may be of an empirical or a logical sort.21 Practices may, as a matter of fact, make living in accordance with an ideal more feasible, say, psychologically or economically, than it might otherwise be. For example, public schooling helps students pursue ideals, like the ideal of being a great musician, that are logically independent of the practice of public schooling. Conversely, practices are sometimes logically necessary for making any sense at all of particular personal ideals. Apart from legal and political institutions, for example, it would not make sense to even call oneself a lawyer or a politician, let alone to aspire to be a great lawyer or politician.

Personal ideals are typically individuated in part with respect to the social domains on which they logically depend. Ideals range from the more general (e.g., being a generous, courageous, or just person) to the more specific (e.g., being a great chess player, being a good grandparent), depending on the breadth of their social domains. General ideals are individuated by the domains of the broadest forms of social organization, or practice.22 These ideals include possessing the moral virtues: for instance, being a generous person (the domain of property, as it regards others), being a just person (the domain of distributions of limited resources), being an honest person (the domain of truth-telling to others), and being a courageous person (the domain of fearsome dangers in relation to the pursuit of public goods).23 Some general ideals, like being a respectful person, are not restricted in their application to any particular social institution, and are all the more important for being so general. Not all general ideals are moral ideals. A romantic ideal of living a passionate life does not seem to be tied to any particular social world—it might even require of the passionate individual that she not be constrained by any particular society—and does not seem to involve particular moral demands.

Specific ideals are typically complex arrangements of general aims and values that apply to domains that are structured by smaller scale social organizations. Ideals of citizenship, for instance, are complex insofar as they are constituted by orderings of various subsidiary aims, like cultivating patience, respectfulness, courage, affability, diligence, and patriotism, as applied to the domain of citizenship. Aspiring to be a great chess player means having an ideal that combines a range of subsidiary intellectual and moral aims and skills, such as developing general computational abilities, cultivating patience, even-temperament, and resolve, and is logically (not merely empirically) tied to a specific social organization, the chessworld, and specific techniques required for
excellence in that domain. It might be that some specific ideals involve domains that are less obviously structured by social institutions, if at all; but, I suspect, these will be few and far between.

Ideals, like social roles, can be hierarchically arranged. General ideals may apply to and regulate many roles: what it is to be a good educator is plausibly constrained and guided by what it is to be a good citizen, but not vice versa. For, one purpose of education, plausibly, is the preparation of individuals for civic life. So, pedagogical ideals are constrained by civic ideals.

Although personal ideals are often related to social roles, the former cannot always be explanatorily reduced to the latter. As one can competently play a role that one is indifferent to, playing a role is surely not sufficient for having an ideal. Nonetheless, social roles, like personal ideals, are characterized in terms of the goals of some social organization or practice and in terms of the methods that are thought best to attain those goals. Some ideals can and must be understood in terms of the roles to which they correspond: what it is to be a great lawyer, and to aspire to be a great lawyer, depends on what it is to be a lawyer. Other ideals are less role-dependent: although what it is to be a great friend does correspond with what it is to play the role of a friend, it is doubtful whether we can characterize the social role of the friend independently of an account of what it is to be a good friend. That is because the role of friend is not the creation of any particular organization but, rather, a title that goes to those who live at least somewhat in accordance with the ideal of the good friend. Likewise, with the role of hero: heroes are those who live in accordance with certain ideals and to the extent that there is a role of hero it derives from the relevant ideal. Thus, some ideals are grounded in roles while some roles are grounded in ideals. So, ideals cannot in general be explanatorily reduced to roles.

Personal ideals also are not restricted to those socio economic tasks, such as politician or scientist, with which one identifies and feels “called” to do. Such callings, or vocations, as opposed to mere occupations, indeed embody commitments to personal ideals in the domain of specialized labor. But so do avocations, such as mastering the pipe organ or cultivating one’s garden. Moreover, general personal ideals, such as being courageous, logically depend on social practices that transcend particular vocations or avocations.

Living in accordance with a specific and complex ideal does not require full possession of the ideal’s component general ideals. A good elementary school teacher possesses virtues of patience, fairness, imagination, and kindness—at least insofar as they apply to the domain of teaching 5- to 10-year-olds en masse. But while being a good elementary school teacher requires patience with 5- to 10-year olds and their parents, it does not require full possession of the general virtue of patience; nor does the ideal chess player need to possess resolve in all aspects of her life. This is in part because living in accordance with an ideal requires, for any domain, mastery of certain domain-specific techniques. One might have mastered certain techniques of classroom fairness without having mastered techniques of, say, domestic fairness.
Although it is a matter of longstanding dispute whether general moral ideals may conflict with each other, nonmoral ideals, specific and general, are multifarious and clearly may stand in opposition to each other. Being a good romantic may conflict with the ideal of the cynic, and being a good soldier may conflict with the ideal of the pacifist. The possibility of such opposition follows from the fact that social practices can themselves stand in opposition insofar as they are constituted by either (or both) opposing goals or conflicting methods for achieving those goals.

I conclude that personal ideals are typically individuated by the social practices on which they logically depend (i.e., their generality) and by their ordering of various aims and values (i.e., their complexity). This account prepares the ground for the second respect in which personal ideals depend on social practices, namely, reasoning about the content of particular personal ideals. This account of reasoning builds on the claim that social practices are constituted by particular goals and/or methods for attaining particular goals.

2.2 Reasoning about Personal Ideals

The fact that personal ideals are grounded in particular social practices enables interpretation of, and reasoning about, their contents. This social feature of personal ideals in turn undermines the sharp distinction between self-assessment and concern for the self-directed opinions of certain others that we discussed in Section 1, because it entails that self-evaluation with respect to a personal ideal requires sensitivity and receptivity to the judgments of others.

Practitioners and critics of a social practice develop standards for ideals that are indexed to that practice. In the course of this development, the aims of a practice help to provide a common point of view for its members. (Who counts as a member is itself up for discussion.) I argue in this section that those engaged in developing these standards aim to give reasons to each other that would convince anyone who takes up a common point of view. This shared aim makes it possible to interpret and argue rationally about the content of personal ideals.

Although determining the ontological and epistemic status of personal ideals is beyond the scope of this article, it matters that people who disagree over the content of a specific ideal may reasonably aspire to objectivity. Let us consider examples of public reasoning about ideals relating to sports, which, for all their popularity, might seem entirely arbitrary and unimportant to the uninitiated. Many sports fans argue, for example, that the ideal team sports player must contribute to the success of his or her team and, though this is a matter of some dispute among critics and players, that those who hold impressive individual records might nonetheless fail to achieve the status of greatness if they never lead their team to a championship (or at least to notable success). Dan Marino was by all accounts a good quarterback for the Miami Dolphins, but does his failure to have ever played on a Super Bowl–winning team count against considering him one of the great American...
football players? This question reflects a tension between individualistic and collective considerations that extends beyond the sports arena to all collective endeavors. This is a substantive question, and this point is not to resolve it. Rather, the point is that resolution of the question requires offering reasons that would convince anyone (or at least any interested party) who takes up the common point of view of the social practice, and that actual disputants typically recognize this requirement.

Likewise, there is longstanding public reasoning about whether membership in the pantheon of great players may be denied if one commits ethical wrongs. The Pete Rose gambling controversy is about the extent to which ethical considerations permeate baseball ideals, and members of the baseball world offer reasons to each other that they hope will convince any interested person taking up a common point of view. Members have this power of determination because they are not, as those of us on the outside are, entirely constrained in their reasoning by the existing goals and rules of the game—they may amend the game itself if they see fit to do so. I will call the complex of a social institution and its objectively aimed reason-giving practice a social form.

But can there really be any objective measure of Pete Rose’s greatness as a baseball player or Dan Marino’s greatness as a football player? Surely, if any of our preferences lack objectivity, they include preferences about trivial matters such as these. Perhaps specific personal ideals differ from the most general personal ideals (both moral and intellectual) in that the specific ideals are a subjective matter. This objection gains force from the highly contingent nature of specific organizations, such as Major League Baseball, which suggests that deliberation about baseball norms does not track any objective truth whatsoever.

However, consider what it is to have and to argue over some personal ideal. Having an ideal requires caring to at least some minimal degree about one’s living in accordance with the ideal. This in turn requires a significant degree of endorsement—call it baseline endorsement—of the relevant social form: its aims, methods, and norms of success. Baseline endorsement makes possible objective dispute among practitioners over the content of a single ideal, as opposed to dispute over the development of different ideals with differing aims, methods, and/or norms of success. One does not need to care about the ideal to argue over its contours. But arguing over the content of the ideal does involve appealing to considerations that might, in principle, convince impartial adherents of the ideal.

These considerations about baseline endorsement apply general interpretive principles to the special case of personal ideals. Much is taken for granted in order merely to fix the subject matter of any dispute. Only if we can identify what is common ground among apparent disputants can we make sense of their activity as a genuine dispute. I am arguing that we can make sense of the reason-giving activity relating to personal ideals in this way if we see that there is much common ground and that disputants rely on (and develop) norms that they expect persons taking up a common point of view to assent to.
So, it would be a mistake to assume that there cannot be an objective common point of view merely because only interested persons would care to weigh in, or because the relevant social practice is highly contingent. Moreover, the claim that a dispute is trivial does not entail that there are no objective standards relevant to its resolution.

Where we cannot identify substantial common ground, a new ideal may be created, especially if something important is at stake. New ideals are often generated via schism, when disagreement about the content of some ideal apparently cannot be settled. For instance, although musicians and musicologists generally admire John Cage as one of the twentieth century’s great composers, there is yet some doubt as to whether he is, in fact, a musical composer. Is 4’33” a musical composition? Cage’s insistence that the sounds produced by the audience and other “background noise” are *bona fide* musical objects has seemed to prevail among critics. However, this expansion of the form has to a large extent been cataloged as “experimental” or “aleatoric” music, a fact that testifies either to the introduction of a new genre or to the continued resistance of some critics (or both). There is a schism here insofar as there is an open question as to whether a good experimental composer is also a good composer, insofar, that is, as Schoenberg’s description of Cage makes sense to us: “He is not a composer, but an inventor—of genius.”

The very interpretation of one’s ideals cannot be separated from public discourse about them, and in this respect ideals resemble all other things that carry meaning. This is especially so in the case of role-based ideals, as roles are themselves typically institutionalized social functions. Being a doctor, a parent, a nurse, or a teacher means playing a functional role that is largely defined by the needs of society. As such, the standards for these roles are also largely defined by the needs and expectations of some subset of society. Being a good doctor means playing the role of doctor well. The very interpretation, let alone the justification, of such ideals cannot be undertaken apart from the broad demands of the relevant social form. These demands constrain, but do not determine, the nature of such roles and their corresponding standards.

I conclude that the content and justification of a personal ideal both have ties to the give and take of reasons between the participants in the relevant social form, and that the reasons offered in favor of some interpretation of an ideal are intended to persuade any interested person who takes up a common point of view.

### 2.3 The Moral Psychology of Personal Ideals

The social practice theory of personal ideals does not entail that agents think about some social form whenever they are pursuing a personal ideal. An excellent chess player does not usually think about her fellow chess players and their storied history when she deliberates her next move. Such thoughts may be prudentially or ethically inappropriate, and a personal ideal includes norms about, among other things, when it would be inappropriate to think explicitly
about social forms. This is not to deny, however, that social practices shape and constrain the moral psychology of the pursuit of one’s ideals.

First, the moral psychology of the concern for living in accordance with one’s personal ideals is shaped by the internalization of the social dynamics that I described in the previous subsection. Consider Alasdair MacIntyre’s illuminating discussion of the moral psychology of internalizing the ideal of being a good chess player. In the learning stages, the pupil may not care particularly about chess—its rules, its history, its different schools of strategy, or its techniques. If she wants to learn the game it may be for the sake of goods that are external to chess; she may want to learn a game in order to play something with her friends, to fill her free time, to improve her college application, or bond with her niece. However, with practice and initiation she may come to appreciate goods that are internal to chess, that is, goods that are specifiable only in chess terms and recognizable only by those with experience of the game. The acquisition of personal ideals therefore requires and conditions a certain degree of receptivity to the valuations and behavior of others who share the practice.

Psychological traces of this socialization remain after the novice internalizes the ideal. This etiology illuminates much of our emotional experience. For instance, Bernard Williams plausibly claims that “the psychological model for [shame and guilt] . . . involves an internalized figure. In the case of shame this is, I have suggested in the text, a watcher or witness. In the case of guilt, the internalized figure is a victim or an enforcer.” As Williams notes, this figure can, but need not, be a particular individual or a representative of some social group. The internalized witness may be characterized, instead, in ethical terms as “one whose reactions I would respect; equally, he is conceived as someone who would respect those same reactions if they were appropriately directed to him.”

The social practice theory of personal ideals builds on social aspects of our moral psychology that Williams and MacIntyre discuss. The normatively characterized witness that Williams describes (“one whose reaction I respect”) is, I suggest, typically a product of the internalization of the norms of social practices. For such a figure is typically an abstracted, idealized, and refined composite of the members of the relevant social practice. As Williams suggests, the fact that this ethically characterized figure is tethered to the real world is crucial for making sense of shame’s phenomenology:

The internalized other is indeed abstracted and generalized and idealized, but he is potentially somebody rather than nobody, and somebody other than me. He can provide the focus of real social expectations, of how I shall live if I act in one way rather than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter my relations to the world about me.

Williams’s spectatorial model of the internalized other can be used to provide an account of pride, as well as shame. In the following section, I focus on pride and show that it bears traces of the fact that personal ideals are social
practice–dependent norms that are acquired by internalizing the norm-guided activities, including praising and blaming activities, of representatives of that social practice.

3. Pride

I turn now to consider the role that social aspects of personal ideals play in generating the two puzzles identified in the introduction of this article. For ease of presentation I focus mainly on pride, although there are corresponding puzzles in the case of shame.

3.1 The Sociality Puzzle

The sociality puzzle is to explain how pride can be both a self-regarding and an other-regarding psychological phenomenon. The emotion of pride is a self-regarding attitude insofar as it represents the self in a favorable light. And yet the phenomenology of pride involves the representation of some actual or imaginary praising spectator, and the primary social function of pride is to signal the presence of intact social bonds to oneself and others. Why should a form of self-assessment involve any representation of, or signaling to, others? How is it even possible that a judgment about the self can take the form of a thought about another? The solution I propose depends on the account of personal ideal internalization just given, according to which personal ideals are social practice-dependent norms that are acquired by (i) representing to oneself the norm-guided activities, including praising and blaming activities, of representatives of that social practice; and (ii) valuing the internal goods of the practice.

Traces of this socialization remain even once internalization is complete. In the experience of feeling pride, one assesses oneself in terms of the (actual or imaginary) response of an (actual or imaginary) observer. Absent this internalization one cannot feel pride, even if representative members of a social practice that one wishes to be a part of actually praise one and one believes that they are correct (by the lights of the practice) to do so. In such a case one may feel joy, relief, gratitude, or hope—but not pride. Suppose, for example, that one wishes to be a part of a community of avant-garde composers merely because members of this community receive invitations to the best parties and other goods that are external to the practice. On having one’s work performed in elite music venues and art galleries, one might plausibly feel joy, delight, and gratitude. But one will not feel proud about one’s musical successes, at least not under that description. (One might feel a more general pride in being a member of the social or cultural elite, say. But if so, then one has internalized more general social or cultural ideals).

So, it is possible for an assessment of the self to take the form of a representation of others because personal ideals are both psychologically and conceptually linked to the internalization of social forms. The positive
assessment involved in feeling the emotion of pride presupposes that the appropriate reactions of representative members of this social form to the object of assessment (e.g., to oneself or one’s achievements) involve admiration or gratitude.\(^{38}\)

We are now in a position to explain why, as I claimed in Section 1, the social practice theory of personal ideals undermines two premises of Deigh’s critique of accounts of pride and shame that are based primarily on assessments of self-worth. Let us take these in turn.

First, I claimed that our best understanding of personal ideals could give a central role to concerns about the opinions of others. The theory sketched above supports this claim. As public reasoning largely determines the content of our ideals, people who strive to live in accordance with these ideals should concern themselves with the opinions of others, even when these opinions diverge from that of the agent. Crito should concern himself with the opinions of his fellow citizens as well as with the opinion of Socrates. For through reasoning with each other about what should persuade those who take up a common point of view, these members of the community largely determine the public content of Crito’s ideals of courage and honor. This is not to deny the possibility of widespread popular error about Crito’s actions, say through ignorance of the particular facts of the case or widespread misunderstanding about our obligations to the law. But Crito is rightly concerned to make sure that he is not in error, and his shame helps to motivate his consultation with Socrates on the matter.

Second, I claimed that the standards provided by personal ideals need not be restricted to our activity as authors of our lives, and could regard one’s social status as relevant to this self-assessment. I suggest, though the claim cannot be fully defended here, that our social identities, like our personal ideals, are individuated and given content largely on the basis of social practices. The social identities that underlie emotions of pride or shame, such as one’s identity as an aristocrat, an American, a Mashpee, a Jew, are infused with personal ideals. What should we make, then, of Deigh’s claim that an aristocrat might be ashamed of having behaved like a common person even if he lacks aristocratic personal ideals? Deigh suggests that we interpret the shame in this example as a reaction to the threat of demeaning treatment that the aristocrat’s common behavior invites from other aristocrats. However, this interpretation is contentious. If such a person lacks any concern for living in accordance with aristocratic personal ideals—say, because he is wholeheartedly egalitarian—then it is unclear how to properly understand his pain in behaving like a common person. Indeed, it is unclear why he is pained at all, rather than pleased, at his behavior. While Deigh’s interpretation has psychological plausibility, it is contentious to call such pain “shame” rather than “fear” or “embarrassment,” as such an interpretation begs the question at issue.

Moreover, Deigh’s social disqualification account of shame seems unable to distinguish threats of demeaning treatment that occasion shame from threats of demeaning treatment that occasion fear, anger, or even pleasure—as when
Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that he welcomed the hatred of his fellow aristocrats that he occasioned by betraying his class in favor of common Americans. The personal ideals account of pride and shame, together with the social practice theory of personal ideals, provides a principle for distinguishing these types of cases. So, this analysis crucially undergirds social disqualification accounts. Social disqualification accounts of shame must explain which relations to others are relevant to shame and why they are so. The answer, I argue, is that the reactions of (real or imagined) representatives of the relevant practice are relevant insofar as and because one internalizes the norms of that practice.

One might object that this argument equivocates on the meaning of “receptivity” with respect to social forms. I have assumed that being receptive in the sense of being beholden to norms largely generated by social forms and not by personal choice alone (call this receptivity as heteronomy) entails being receptive in the sense of being emotionally sensitive to the valuations of representative members of the relevant social forms (call this receptivity as emotional sensitivity). But it seems that one could internalize a personal ideal, and so participate in a social form, without caring at all about the valuations of representative members of the social form. If so, then receptivity as heteronomy does not entail receptivity as emotional sensitivity and, so, the social practice theory of personal ideals does not help us to explain the emotions of pride and shame.39

Responding to this objection requires, first, fleshing out an under described scenario. Why might a person who has internalized a personal ideal not care about the shaming or praising activity of acknowledged (real or imaginary) representative members of the relevant social practice? Perhaps he or she is arrogant or conceited. Or, perhaps he or she is so fully absorbed in activity (say, competing to be a chess grandmaster or performing plastic surgery) that there is no emotional energy, so to speak, to expend elsewhere—and even if there were, it would be self-indulgent or otherwise foolish to do. Or, perhaps he or she is in the midst of a social practice schism of the sort that John Cage faced (see Section 2.2), and so the lack of concern about the valuations of representative members of the social practice signals that he or she no longer shares a personal ideal with these representative members. The account of pride and shame that I have sketched has the resources to explain, with some plausibility, each of these scenarios in a way that, I believe, removes any threat to the argument of this article. The first scenario I return to in the next section; the second and third scenarios I have already discussed. However, I grant that there may be some (perhaps extremely general, or extremely specific and idiosyncratic) personal ideals, some social practices, and some individuals such that being properly committed to the ideals and practices is consistent with a total lack of emotional sensitivity to the praising and blaming of representative practitioners. But I confess that I cannot conceive of any such ideals, practices, or individuals. In any case, the existence of such ideals, practices, or individuals would not show that, in more psychologically and sociologically typical cases, the social practice theory of personal ideals does not help us to explain the emotions of pride and shame.
Finally, we should note that, even when one is not experiencing the emotion of pride, one may still have a firm commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. This commitment, too, has self- as well as other-directed aspects. This commitment obviously involves self-directed aspects, because it is a second-order commitment to understanding and evaluating oneself in terms of the set of ideals that one cares about. This commitment also involves a commitment to living in accordance with norms that regulate some social practice of which one is a member. Having such a commitment therefore requires having a kind of solidarity with the (real or ideal) members of some social organization. This solidarity consists of shared values that justify the goals of the shared moral practice, some degree of sympathetic identification with one’s fellow members, and a shared commitment to regulate one’s life in accordance with the values and goals of the practice.

I conclude that the sociality objection has been met. The personal ideals account of pride, in conjunction with a social practice theory of personal ideals, has the resources to dissolve the sociality puzzle.

3.2 The Hierarchy Puzzle

The second puzzle arises from the fact that some paradigm cases of pride are divisive and hierarchical, embodying a socially disruptive sense of distance from others, while others embody camaraderie and solidarity, a sense of closeness to others. The task to explain how this can be so is especially pressing for theorists, such as Scheff, who characterize pride exclusively in terms of intact social bonds.

According to the social practice theory of personal ideals, caring about an ideal typically places one in a (notional if not actual) community with others who largely share certain standards of evaluation. Feeling fitting pride requires meeting standards that members of this community endorse or should endorse. Hence meeting these standards warrants respect, if not admiration, from others (real or imaginary) in the community. This delivers the first link to pride’s social dimensions, which Scheff and others emphasize: as living in accordance with an ideal warrants evaluative respect from others (real or imaginary) in the community, it grounds bonding and camaraderie with others in the social practice.

In order to explain the second—divisive and hierarchical—link to pride’s social dimensions, I suggest that we consider ways of misunderstanding or being motivated to undermine the very social bases of one’s personal ideals. Such cognitive and conative relations to our social practices, I suggest, constitute vicious forms of the character trait of pride, such as arrogance and conceit. There is no space here to develop a complete account of virtuous and vicious pride, but I can gesture at how such an account might rest on the social theory of personal ideals defended here.40 I have argued that a firm commitment to living in accordance with one’s ideals ought to manifest one’s camaraderie with fellows of one’s practice. But such a commitment can go awry and foment divisiveness. 
in at least two ways. One kind of impropriety lies in caring in the wrong way about receiving the respect of others. Vanity is partly constituted by caring too much about receiving this respect, or by caring about receiving this respect from the wrong people, including outsiders to the practice. Arrogance is partly constituted by caring too little about receiving this respect. A proper concern for earning the respect of certain other members of one’s social practice is important for sustaining social practices, as it leads people to exchange reasons with each other about how best to conceive, or to attain the aims, of the practice. This is one way in which understanding one’s commitments to personal ideals in terms of social practices helps to solve the hierarchy puzzle.

A second way in which one’s cognitive and conative commitments to personal ideals can go awry is interpreting one’s ideals in terms of a zero-sum view of merit, according to which one person’s meeting her ideals requires that (at the limit) no other people meet these ideals. Such individualistic misinterpretations undermine the social point of the typical ideal. When a member of some organization cares more about being the best member than about the practice achieving its foundational aims, we say that she fails to be a team player. This sort of vicious pride is not merely competitive, but also divisive—the proud person cares too much about being better than others rather than being excellent. So, these are two ways in which the social practice theory of personal ideals helps us to explain divisive hierarchical pride in terms of failures to understand or to properly care about the social bases of one’s personal ideals.

One might object that the individualistic vices just described apply, at most, in contexts where teamwork is required and, so, do not generalize to all instances of divisive hierarchical pride. Some arrogant or snobbish pride surely takes place outside of a collaborative, team-oriented setting. Furthermore, one might object that competitive striving for excellence need not be vicious and, certainly, need not rest on any cognitive mistake about the social character of personal ideals. That is, one might object that the vices just described are neither necessary nor sufficient for divisive hierarchical pride.

In response, let us clarify that the hierarchy puzzle requires explaining divisive pride, not mere competitive pride. Competitive desires and behavior are neither necessary nor sufficient for the vices described above. Indeed, competitors should, and often do, recognize the embeddedness of competition in social institutions. This norm is standardly met in competitive sports and politics, where incivility and the ruthless destruction of institutional norms are standardly seen—or, at least, they ought to be seen—as blameworthy. As winning without excellence is not typically seen as desirable, the competitor’s goal is not typically the mere defeat of one’s competition. So, nothing that I have claimed entails that competitive striving for excellence is mistaken or perverse.

Moreover, the first part of this objection overlooks an important implication of the social practice–based account of personal ideals, namely, that ideals generally—and not merely in the case of team-oriented settings—derive their force from some social practice that has established goals and methods for achieving
those goals. Personal ideals typically provide norms for self-assessment that make sense and have normative force only in light of such a social practice. Hierarchical divisive pride, I am claiming, typically involves a rejection of the grounds for solidarity that accompany virtuous forms of pride. This rejection may signify that the ideal has not been properly internalized, as the concern for interpersonal superiority, like the concern for fame or money, is typically a concern for an external good. So, this account is not restricted to explicitly identified team-oriented settings.

Let us turn, finally, from vicious forms of the character trait of pride to the emotion of pride and its relation to divisive hierarchy. As discussed in the introduction, it is often observed that we feel pride in what sets us apart from others and not merely in excellence \textit{simpliciter}. Consider the following two competing hypotheses about this phenomenon: first, it may be that the emotion of pride is, by its very nature, an exclusionary psychological state. Rousseau is widely thought to have held this view insofar as he argued that the emotion of pride essentially manifests an innate and ineradicable desire for comparing oneself favorably against others (i.e., \textit{amour propre}). A second, competing, hypothesis is that the common desire to compare oneself favorably against others is conceptually (if not psychologically) independent of the emotion of pride. On this view, one might feel pride without, as Augustine might phrase it, wanting to lord it over others (i.e., \textit{libido dominandi}). This view would be charged with explaining why, if not because of any conceptual relation, emotional pride seems to be so frequently associated with interpersonal comparison.

The second hypothesis is more compelling for three reasons. First, the Rousseauvian thought that the feeling of pride necessarily involves interpersonal comparison encounters many apparently decisive counterexamples. One can be proud of a private, unadvertised accomplishment that has nothing to do with others and that one believes is even overshadowed by the accomplishments of others. A story involving some interpersonal rivalry can always be concocted, of course; but such stories seem \textit{ad hoc}. Second, if I am right that the emotion involves a judgment that one is living in accordance with one’s ideals, then it makes sense that competitive concerns would piggy-back on the emotion. For, as a matter of sociological fact, meeting an ideal is likely to be a rare feat that would provide grounds for interpersonal comparison. Those who possess the independent desire to be superior to others will naturally exploit their prideworthy accomplishments to this end. Finally, as Rousseau insisted, divisive competitive pride often arises from a flawed distribution mechanism for praise and evaluative respect. In inegalitarian practices honor will inevitably be unfairly distributed. Those who deserve honor will tend to be dissatisfied as they will tend not to be recognized. But, as Rousseau also noted, this fact is highly contingent. A world with fair distribution mechanism for praise would not incentivize divisive pursuits. We have reason to believe that in such a world emotional pride would more often be nondivisive.
I conclude that the existence of divisive aspects of emotional pride depends on a concern for interpersonal superiority that is conceptually independent of the emotion of pride. This concern with hierarchy often reflects lack of cognitive and conative appreciation for the basis of personal ideals in social forms. Those who have such a concern may see fit to express it on occasions in which they feel pride. However, those who lack such a concern may experience perfectly nondivisive and noncomparative emotional pride.

4. Conclusion

I have called attention to two important features of pride that, in spite of their familiarity, demand explanation: first, pride is an assessment of the self in terms of a judgment about the psychological state of some internalized (real or imaginary) other person, and that it signals intact social bonds to oneself and others; and second, despite the solidarity implied in the first feature, pride sometimes divides social groups. I used these two puzzles to motivate a theory of personal ideals, two features of which I sketched in Section 2: first, personal ideals are individuated in terms of social practices, and second, the process of reasoning about personal ideals is tied to particular social practices. This theory contributes to the development of a philosophical literature on personal ideals, the paucity of which is lamentable (and occasionally lamented). This theory also defends personal ideals accounts of pride and shame against the sociality objections described in Section 1.

In Section 3, I argued that the social practice model of internalization helps to make sense of the social bonding that is often present with the emotion of pride. I also argued that the divisive dimensions of the emotion do not necessarily accompany the emotion of pride. Furthermore, I linked the evaluative status of various forms of the character trait of pride, such as vanity and arrogance, directly to the social practice theory of ideals. Divisive aspects of the trait are best understood as a product of improper cognitive and conative relations to the social nature of most personal ideals—that is, to the fact that they derive their point and purpose from the goals and internal goods of a shared practice. The virtuous form of the trait of pride demonstrates on the agent’s part a solidarity with other members (real or imagined) of the shared practice.

The upshot of these arguments is twofold. First, it is a mistake to suppose that self-regarding accounts of shame and pride cannot make sense of the distinctive social psychology of these emotions. This mistake derives, perhaps, from a more general confusion about the dependence of our personal ideals on social practices. Second, ethical projects aiming to divorce our personal ideals from social life, and philosophical projects determined to understand these ideals without investigating their bases in social forms, risk thinning out the very meaning of both our ideals and our emotional lives. So, the arguments of this article lead to the surprising conclusion that grounding our understanding of pride and shame in personal ideals, properly construed, actually deepens rather
than constrains our appreciation of the social nature of these emotions.

I am grateful for helpful feedback from Angela Smith, William Talbott, Rachel Fredericks, Janice Moskalik, Elizabeth Scarbrough, Brandon Morgan-Olson, and three anonymous reviewers.

Notes


3 Rawls, *Theory of Justice*.


8 For a recent defense of the personal ideals account of pride, see Fischer, “Feeling Proud.”


10 Cf. David Hume, who argues that “we are rejoiced for many goods, which, on account of their frequency, give us no pride” (*A Treatise of Human Nature*, 2.1.6.4). See also Leslie Gaines, Jamieson Duvall, J. Matthews Webster, and Richard H. Smith, “Feeling Good after Praise for a Successful Performance: The Importance of Social Comparison Information,” *Self and Identity* 4 (2005): 373–89.

11 Our personal ideals, and the social practices they depend upon, also help to explain whom we may intelligibly take vicarious pride or shame in. For one account of vicarious pride and shame that is based in personal ideals, see Helm, *Love, Friendship, and the Self*.


13 Ibid., 233.

14 Ibid., 236.

15 Ibid., 238.

16 Ibid., 240.

17 Ibid., 240.

18 Ibid., 242.

19 Calhoun, “Apology for Moral Shame,” presents a similar defense of shame in terms of shared social practices. The arguments in the present article extend Calhoun’s work in several respects, although I am uncertain as to whether Calhoun would endorse these results. First, whereas Calhoun focuses exclusively on moral shame and social practices of morality, the present article considers all varieties of norms, including aesthetic and athletic norms, and the corresponding varieties of (moral and nonmoral) pride and shame. Second, while the present article develops a social practice theory of personal ideals to buttress a personal ideals account of pride and shame, Calhoun’s conclusions appear to be compatible with the rejection of this account of pride and
shame as this account explains these emotions to a considerable degree in terms of the subject’s evaluative endorsements.


Thanks to Rolf Goebel for discussion about this point.

I, therefore, endorse Elizabeth Anderson’s conclusion that “people interpret and justify their valuations by exchanging reasons for them with the aim of reaching a common point of view from which others can achieve and reflectively endorse one another’s valuations” (*Value in Ethics and Economics*, 3).

The development of standards can be understood as a matter either of creation or discovery. In cases in which people decide what goals their institutions should aim at, this development is a matter of creation; in cases in which methods are developed to attain socially established goals, this development will be a matter of discovery. It is sometimes unclear what sort of development is at hand.

For what it is worth, Wikipedia editors hold this failure to be a reason against Marino’s greatness, though this reason is overridden by other considerations: “Despite never being on a Super Bowl–winning team, he is recognized as one of the greatest quarterbacks in football history.” Retrieved February 27, 2015, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dan_Marino

As David Velleman (“Motivation by Ideal,” *Philosophical Exploration* 5, no. 2 (2002): 89–103) has argued, this concern may take the form, not of a desire to meet the ideal, but rather of an attempt at make-believe—imagining that one is another person who one aspires to be, and acting as he or she would act (which may not involve any desire to meet an ideal).


MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 188ff.


Ibid., 84.

The theory of the moral psychology of emotional self-assessment presented here also develops and applies the work of G. H. Mead, who argues that “through self-criticism, social control over individual behavior or conduct operates by virtue of the social origin and basis of such criticism. That is to say, self-criticism is essentially social criticism” (*Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934], 255).


Ibid., 84.

Patricia Greenspan argues similarly, and makes this conclusion central to her account of moral motivation: “In more normal cases where we raise the question “Why be moral?” the answer may be given by appeal to a form of pride—not specifically to the affective rewards of the occurrent emotion but to a presupposition of its evaluative content: the claim moral behavior

39 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.


42 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.


45 Harry Frankfurt notes that, “For the most part, the ideals to which a person freely devotes his life are not exclusively or even primarily moral ideals. I have made a few stabs, in the title essay of the collection and in some of those that were written subsequent to it, toward the development of a theory of ideals. This is, surprisingly and unfortunately, a rather neglected subject, about which I wish I had more to say” (*The Importance of What We Care About* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988], vii–viii). For recent discussion of personal ideals, see Sarah Buss, “The Irrationality of Unhappiness and the Paradox of Despair,” *Journal of Philosophy* 101 (2004): 167–96; and Kimberley Brownlee, “Moral Aspirations and Ideals,” *Utilitas* 22 (2010): 241–57.

46 I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing to my attention this implication of the present argument.